

# ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTION OF MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES

#### EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ALBANIA

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## **Outline**

Introduction

Literature review

Methodology

Empirical results

Final remarks

#### **Motivation**

- ➤In Albania a small, open, and highly euroized economy monetary and macroprudential policies often interact through shared transmission channels.
- ➤ Lack of coordination can create policy conflicts or unintended side effects.
- Existing literature lacks system-level empirical evidence on their dynamic interplay in such contexts.
- > This study fills the gap by:
  - > Creating a new macroprudential policy index,
  - > Applying SVAR-SVEC modeling to capture interactions,
  - ➤ Testing whether policy coordination enhances effectiveness and autonomy of the policies.

### **Methodology & Findings**

#### > Empirical strategy:

- ➤ Structural VAR with Cointegrated Variables (SVAR-SVEC) [Ouliaris, Pagan and Restrepo, 2018]:
  - ➤ Captures long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics.
  - Two cointegration relationships: Price stability (CPI, GDP, interest rate) & Financial stability (bank soundness, macroprudential index, exchange rate)

#### **≻** Main findings:

- ➤ Monetary policy affects macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation) as expected.
- ➤ Macroprudential policy improves financial stability and enables more flexible monetary policy.
- > Evidence of policy coordination:
  - ➤ Macroprudential tightening is often accompanied by monetary easing.
  - > Each policy maintains autonomy, but works complementarily.

# How do monetary and macroprudential policies interact in Albania, and does their coordination enhance the effectiveness of the Bank of Albania in achieving price and financial stability?

- > Do monetary and macroprudential policies in Albania interact dynamically over time?
  - → How do changes in one policy affect the other?
- ➤ Has the Bank of Albania coordinated these two policies effectively from 2000–2022?
- > Does this coordination support both price stability and financial stability without one undermining the other?
  - → Can each policy remain autonomous yet still reinforce the other's effectiveness?

# The literature highlights how monetary and macroprudential policies interact through shared transmission channels, with recent studies emphasizing the benefits of coordinated policy responses.

#### Bernanke et al. (1996); Jiménez et al. (2012):

USA (1980s–1990s), Spain (2002–2008): Analyze the impact of monetary policy on credit supply and borrower risk behavior. Find that low interest rates increase borrowing and encourage financial risk-taking.

#### Borio & Zhu (2008); Adrian & Shin (2012):

Cross-country & USA (1999–2007): Examine the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and its effect on financial institutions. Find that accommodative monetary policy increases leverage and weakens credit standards.

#### Altavilla et al. (2020):

Euro area (2010–2018): Investigate the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in Europe. Find that macroprudential easing amplifies the effects of monetary accommodation, especially for less capitalized banks.

#### Cozzi et al. (2020); Mendicino et al. (2020)

Study the effects of capital requirements and their interplay with monetary policy. Find that stricter macroprudential rules reduce credit growth short-term but enhance long-term stability.


#### For Albania:

The studies so far are conducted within a single equation framework, without studying the system dynamics.

- ➤ Macroprudential Policy Index (PMP):
  - Based on official BoA decisions.
  - Built following **Alam et al. (2019)** methodology:
    - Assigns values to policy actions:
      - **+1** for tightening measures
      - **-1** for easing measures
      - **0** for neutral
      - Adjusted by ±0.5 in partial or indirect measures.

•Reflects the direction and intensity of macroprudential policy over time.

Figure 1. Performance of the macroprudential policy (MPP) index.



Source: Bank of Albania and authors' calculations.

#### **Methodology and Data**

- > Structural Vector Autoregressive model (SVAR) & Structural Vector Error Correction (SVEC)
- ➤ Ouliaris, Pagan e Restrepo (2018) framework
- > Captures short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium via cointegration
- > Variables:
  - ➤ Monetary policy: REPO rate, CPI
  - ➤ Macroprudential policy: MPP index, banking soundness index (BSI)
  - ➤ Macroeconomic context: GDP, exchange rate (ALL/EUR)
- Two identified long-run relationships:
  - Price stability (CPI-driven)
  - Financial stability (BSI-driven)
- > Data sources: Bank of Albania (& decisions of the Supervisory Council), National Statistical Offices, IMF
- > Frequency: quarterly data for 2000-2022

Figure 2. Imposed restrictions.


F	ε <sub>GDP</sub>	ε <sub>REPO</sub>	<b>E</b> <sub>ec1</sub>	ε <sub>ER</sub>	ε <sub>MAPP</sub>	E <sub>ec2</sub>
GDP	NA	0	0	0	0	0
REPO	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
CPI <sub>(EC1)</sub>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0
ER	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
MAPP	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
BSI <sub>(EC2)</sub>	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	NA


•	MP does not affect GDP in the short-
	run.


• MP does not react to stabilize the exchange rate.


S						
	ε <sub>GDP</sub>	ε <sub>REPO</sub>	<b>€</b> <sub>ec1</sub>	٤ <sub>ER</sub>	€ <sub>MAPP</sub>	٤ <sub>ec2</sub>
GDP	NA	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
REPO	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA
CPI <sub>(EC1)</sub>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ER	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
MAPP	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
BSI <sub>(EC2)</sub>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

#### **Estimation results:** Results of a positive REPO shock scenario.














#### **Estimation results:** Results of a MPP index shock scenario.














#### **Summary of the results**

#### Monetary Policy Shock (e.g., increase in interest rate):

- > GDP contracts and prices adjust downward as expected.
- > Exchange rate remains stable, showing limited sensitivity.
- Macroprudential policy indicator is unaffected, confirming policy independence.
- > Banking soundness improves due to higher interest margins and capital adequacy, despite increased debt burden.
- > No need for macroprudential intervention, reinforcing monetary policy's standalone effectiveness.

#### Macroprudential Policy Shock (tightening):

- Credit access decreases, leading to lower GDP and prices.
- Slight depreciation of local currency observed.
- > Banking soundness improves, confirming policy effectiveness.
- > Triggers a decrease in interest rates, allowing monetary policy to ease.
- ➤ Macroprudential policy supports monetary policy, especially when interest rates are low or transmission is weak (e.g., during crises).

#### **Final Remarks**

- ➤ Monetary policy effectively influences GDP and inflation, but has little impact on macroprudential indicators.
- ➤ Macroprudential policy affects credit and GDP, but strengthens banking soundness.
- ➤ Policies should remain independent but well-coordinated to ensure both price and financial stability.
- ➤ Policymakers must adapt tools flexibly and consider external factors like ECB policy and exchange rates due to Albania's euroization.
- Conclusions apply to small open economies with flexible regimes; further research is needed for different monetary systems.

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# Thank you for Your attention!

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