

UIP with FX interventions under exchange rate peg and inflation targeting: The case of Ukraine

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


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Summary

- The study modifies an uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition in a semi-structural New Keynesian model with a view to account for exchange rate management by the National bank of Ukraine (NBU)
- Foreign exchange (FX) interventions cushion small open economies against excessive exchange rate fluctuations. Modeled deviations from the pure UIP help assess their effectiveness and the role in stabilizing prices
- Moderate amounts of FX interventions help stabilize both exchange rate and prices. But the exchange rate must remain floating to serve as a monetary policy transmission channel. Aggregate demand is inelastic to the degrees of exchange rate management
- Sterilized FX interventions under IT are more effective than non-sterilized ones under the fixed exchange rate regime



The NBU abandoned fixed exchange rate and adopted IT in 2015 during a “perfect storm”. Ukraine is vulnerable to external shocks



Note: negative FX interventions mean that foreign currency was sold by the NBU on the market
 Source: National Bank of Ukraine, cbonds.com, own estimates

“Perfect storm” in 2014–2015

- Russian military aggression, macroeconomic crisis
- Current account and budget deficits, currency crisis
- Exposed oligarchic banking, banking crisis



The model

- Semi-structural New-Keynesian “in gaps” model of a small open economy
- Similar models are used by many central banks
 - Beneš, J., Clinton, K., George, A., Gupta, P., John, J., Kamenik, O., Laxton, D., Mitra, P., Nadhanael, G.V., Portillo, R., Wang, H., Zhang, F. (2017). Quarterly projection model for India: key elements and properties. IMF Working Papers, 17/33. International Monetary Fund.
- Standard structure with Ukraine specific extensions
 - Open economy IS curve, Phillips curve with expectations, Taylor-type reaction function, hybrid UIP
- Coefficients are estimated with Bayesian techniques separately on the 2006–2014 and 2015–2020:Q1 horizons
 - Strong exchange rate channel to inflation, limited policy transmission to aggregate demand

Hybrid uncovered interest parity

- spot nominal exchange rate in log (up is depreciation)
- risk adjusted interest rate differential (premium is spread between yields on UA Eurobonds and 10y US T-bonds)

$$s_t = s_{t+1} + \text{interv}_t + \frac{1}{4} (i_t^* - i_t + \text{prem}_t) - \gamma_4 \widehat{\text{tot}}_t + \varepsilon_{4,t}$$

- interventions (in terms of impact) are endogenously defined with a view to smooth exchange rate volatility
- willingness to intervene rises with the degree of exchange rate management
- commodity terms of trade (gap) influence the exchange rate in an economy with a large share of commodities in trade
- interventions are applied when current and/or expected exchange rate devaluation deviate from a parity-implied value

$$\text{interv}_t = \frac{\beta_5}{4} \left((\Delta s_t^P - \Delta s_{t+1}) + (\Delta s_t^P - \Delta s_t) \right)$$

- parity-implied value represents relative purchasing power parity, when adjusted for a real exchange rate trend

$$\Delta s_t^P = \Delta \bar{z}_t + \pi_t^T - \pi_t^{*,T}$$

Moderate exchange rate management reduces inflation volatility, but stronger management exacerbates it

Model implied unconditional standard deviations (2015–2020:Q1 parametrization)


	Nominal exchange rate deviations from parity	Model implied interventions	Output gap	Inflation	Policy interest rate
	$\Delta s_t - \Delta s_t^P$	$interv_t$	\hat{y}_t	π_t	i_t^P
$\beta_5 = 0$	1.32	0.00	1.00	1.07	1.16
$\beta_5 = 0.57$	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$\beta_5 = 1$	0.64	1.16	1.00	1.08	1.32
$\beta_5 = 100$	0.01	1.24	0.99	1.22	2.01

Source: own estimates
 Note: values are normalized for each variable to a baseline estimated case of $\beta_5 = 0.57$

- FX interventions in 2015–2020:Q1 prevented the exchange rate from being 32% more volatile. They also stabilized inflation
- Further 36% reduction in exchange rate volatility would have been associated with 8% less stable inflation and 32% more active policy interest rate
- Output gap volatility respond little to changes in the exchange rate management

Systematic deviations from the UIP to a large extent can be explained with strong and lasting effect of FX interventions

Model simulated interventions compared to observed series



Source: National Bank of Ukraine, own estimates
 Note: negative model estimated effect of interventions means that the nominal exchange rate was strengthened

Model simulated interventions regressed on observed series

Dependent variable: model simulated effect of interventions

Variable	Coefficient
actual FX interventions	2.96***
actual FX interventions (-1)	2.80***
dummy0614*actual FX interventions	-1.51
dummy0614*actual FX interventions (-1)	-2.24***
dummy0614	0.50
constant	-1.51*
R-squared	0.62
Observations (2006–2019)	56

1
0.17

Source: own estimates
 Note: model simulated interventions are in % of nominal exchange rate, actual FX interventions are in % of annual GDP; dummy0614 equals one in 2006–2014; * means significance with 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%

- 0.17% of GDP (USD 273 million in 2019) worth of interventions are required to nudge the exchange rate in a necessary direction over the course of two quarters
- Interventions under IT in 2015–2020:Q1 are three times stronger than they used to be in 2006–2014 under the fixed exchange rate regime

Appendix: Impulse response functions to the demand shock for various betas under the 2015–2020:Q1 parametrization

